Despite all the work on how campaign donations influence a politician’s behavior, the nagging question of whether contributions alter how a politician votes or whether these contributions constitute support for like-minded individuals remains unresolved. By combining past campaign contributions literature with work on politicians intrinsically valuing policy outcomes, the authors offer a simple test that examines how politicians’ voting patterns change when they retire and no longer face the threat of lost campaign contributions. If contributions are causing individual politicians to vote differently, there should be systematic changes in voting behavior when future contributions are eliminated. In contrast, if contributors donate to candidates who intrinsically value the same policies, there should be no changes in how a politician votes during the last period. After testing 661 congressmen, who served in the House of Representatives from 1977 to 1990, the authors strongly reject the notion that campaign contributions buy politicians’ votes. Their estimates demonstrate a remarkable degree of stability in voting patterns over time, thus lending support to past work emphasizing that it is costly for ideological politicians to alter their positions.
Do Campaign Donations Alter How a Politician Votes? Or, Do Donors Support Candidtes Who Value the Same Things that they Do?
In the wake of recent reports of questionable campaign finance practices have come ever more draconian proposals to “reform” the campaign finance system. Those proposals pose a disturbing threat to the individual political freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. Under current precedents, none of them could survive a First Amendment challenge.
Filed Under: Contribution Limits, Contribution Limits, Contributions & Limits, Enforcement, Jurisprudence & Litigation, Political Committees & 527s, Research, Jurisprudence & Litigation, Jurisprudence & Litigation
In this article David Mason explains soft money and the constitutional protection for political speech that prevents Congress from limiting it by legislating what can and cannot be done or said and how much money may be spent doing so.
This article first appeared in the Essays in Public Policy series published by the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, in 1997. In Political Money: The New Prohibition Annelise Anderson addresses whether or not we are spending too much on political campaigns and whether either expenditure limits or contribution limits are desirable or effective in accomplishing the purposes they supposedly serve. Rather than increase limits on spending and contributions, she recommends abolishing them but strengthening campaign finance reporting requirements and the speed with which data are made available to the public.
This study challenges the orthodoxy that political money must be limited. The author first outlines the current law of political money and proposals for reform, and then critically examines reformers’ arguments by examining the political and constitutional theories that refute them. She concludes by noting that the best way to resolve the anomalies in the current campaign finance landscape may be to eliminate contribution limits entirely.
Efforts to limit political contributions and spending are extremely popular, yet there is no serious evidence that campaign finance regulation has achieved or will achieve its goals of reducing the influence of money, opening up the political system, and lowering the cost of campaigns. Indeed, since the 1974 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act, spending has risen sharply, the number of political action committees and the amount of PAC spending are up, and incumbents have increased both their reelection rate and the rate at which they outspend their challengers.
This research first clusters campaign activities in Louisiana state legislative elections into five clusters: direct attempts to persuade voters, obtaining the support of other elites, attempts to increase turnout, seeking endorsements from other political officials, and fund raising. Indices created from these clusters are then compared to the situational factors of incumbency and competition as predictors of election outcomes. Data are surveys of candidates for the Louisiana legislature in which they were asked about the conduct of their campaigns and their relative emphasis on various activities. Incumbency was by far the best predictor of what percentage of the vote a candidate obtained, and in open seat contests, expenditures and competition best predicted outcome. Overall, the campaign activities had very little relationship to outcome when controlling for situational factors. Variations occurred between the House and Senate races with implications for challengers” strategies and campaign financing.